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A B S T R A C T
The present paper intends to briefly review the most important concepts of the modern neuropsychology of the frontal
lobes, and to relate these findings to the phenomenology usually encountered in hypnosis research and practice. The frontal
lobes have been studied very intensively during the last several years and some of the results, including the syndromes de-
scribed in frontal-lobe lesions and psychiatric patients, demonstrate striking similarity with hypnotic phenomena. Based
on these similarities, an alternative neuropsychophysiological definition of hypnosis/suggestion is proposed, viewing hyp-
nosis/suggestion as the process of external manipulation with frontal-lobe functions with consequent effects upon the entire
brain potential of the subject.
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Introduction
Hypnosis and hypnosis-like states have been known
and used most probably since the beginnings of human
race. The principles of their functioning, nevertheless,
fall still far from our understanding. At that point, hyp-
nosis results similar to electricity: static charge has been
applied very early in human history, but one had to wait
for its explanation until the second half of the 19th cen-
tury. Frustrating for us but true, the age of explicating
hypnosis has not come yet. We did come closer, however.
Frenetically measuring everyone and everything, we have
started experiments demonstrating activations of the
various parts of the brain. And so we arrive to the story
of the frontal lobes.
Firstly, one should admit that our traditional division
of the brain into lobes is fully inappropriate, since it has
nothing to do with the function. Therefore, it is much
better to speak of the involvement of the prefrontal cor-
tex, which does reduce the neuronal mass we are dealing
with but, unfortunately, not the complexity. Since it is
characterized by several general qualities, it is justified
to consider the prefrontal cortex a functional entity per
se, without contradicting the fact that different cortical
areas might be servicing different input regions, as Patri-
cia Goldman-Rakic suggests1, or supporting even differ-
ent subfunctions, as Michael Petrides wants it2. Precisely
this idea, that is, that the prefrontal cortex somehow
co-ordinates or employs the functions of more posterior
brain areas (which reminds of the function the hypo-
physis has within the endocrine system), might have
been a starting point for locating the processing of hyp-
notic phenomena within the frontal lobes. If one under-
stands suggestion as a system of triggers and inhibitions
directed towards various cerebral activities, than the
frontal lobes might be the right place to look for the
mechanisms supporting this system.
A Frontal-Function Primer
Although elementary division of the frontal lobes dif-
ferentiates also the primary motor area and the pre-
motor cortex, we shall concentrate upon the prefrontal
cortex, standing at the top of the organization of behavior.
Functional reasons suggest to divide the prefrontal cor-
tex into dorsolateral (DLPFC) and ventromedial (VMPFC)
parts.
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
For about three decades already, the implication of
the prefrontal cortex in working memory (visuospatial;
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representational memory) has intensively been studied3.
In monkies, it has been found that »the principal sulcus
contains a mechanism for guiding responses on the basis
of stored information in the absence of external cues«,
the memories for object locations being mapped in visuo-
-spatial co-ordinates4. Lesion experiments suggest the
dorsal prefrontal cortex has a role in the temporal order
of information retrieval, while temporal-lobe lesions
proved to have no influence on this capability (but only
on visual recognition)5. Some human experiments have
indicated that the activation of the same prefrontal area
46 (middle frontal gyrus) was correlated with the perfor-
mance of a spatial working-memory task6. A more recent
study of humans by Courtney et al.7 described the area
specialized for spatial working memory to be located
»more superiorly and posteriorly than in the monkey.«
Some psychological theories quite precisely match
what we know about dorsolateral prefrontal cortex from
experience with patients. So it is with Shallice’s Supervi-
sory Attention System (SAS), involved in the choice of
non-routine procedures8,9. The routinized choice of be-
havioral schemata, called contention scheduling, is in-
hibited by the SAS. A test sensitive to these functions is
the Tower of London. Lesion studies confirmed the pro-
longation of response-initiation reaction times and the
appearance of difficulties in response suppression (where
the expected response was to complete a sentence)10. The
hypothesis of a Central Executive11, where the outputs
from a phonological store and visuospatial scratchpad
are supposed to meet, could very likely be nested in the
prefrontal cortex as well.
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
According to Cummings12,13, two functional circuits
are to be differentiated in the VMPFC: the medial pre-
frontal circuit includes an anterior cingulate/ventral stri-
atum/mediodorsal thalamic loop plus multiple limbic,
brainstem, and cortical inputs; while the orbitofrontal
circuit includes an orbital prefrontal cortex/dorsal and
ventral striatal area/mediodorsal and ventral anterior
thalamic loop plus multiple limbic, brainstem, and corti-
cal inputs.
Along with ventromedial aspects of other prefrontal
areas such as the orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior cin-
gulate plays a key role in decision-making, social cogni-
tion, and social judgment14–16. This concept has been
most clearly enunciated in Damasio’s somatic marker
hypothesis which ascribes to the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex the role of »marking« complex stimuli (such as so-
cial situations) with records of past autonomic and emo-
tional responses thereby making possible high level social
judgments such as behavioral inhibition and assessment
of complex social cues16,17. There is evidence that the ca-
pacity to mind-read as well as its more refined sequelae
in the social competencies of adult humans is subserved
at least in part by ventral and medial portions of the
prefrontal cortex18,19.
On the origins of action
The study of patients with frontal damage revealed
precious hints on the role of the frontal lobes in the orga-
nization and control of action. The »unblocked« behavior
(»magnetic apraxia«20, »utilization behavior« or »envi-
ronmental-dependency syndrome« and »imitation be-
havior« as the two stages21,22), following some frontal-
-lobe lesions, was described in details by Lhermitte and
collaborators in the 1980s23. The patients were noted to
use knife and plate even if not hungry (immediately after
lunch, for instance), to put three pairs of glasses at the
top of one another, to write, drink, or urinate when pa-
per, water, or night pot, respectively, had been presented
to them. A patient with multiple bilateral infarctions in
upper frontal convolution, cingulate gyrus, and right
temporal gyri, used to read street- and trade names –
practically each letter in the visual field, and to calculate
with automobile license numbers so as to reach »special
meaning«24. Compulsive counting and eating were noted
in a patient with medial and orbital frontal damage, with
spared basal ganglia (in addition, the patient had difficul-
ties in recognizing funny situations and demonstrated
episodic amnesia and anomia25). Vascular lesion in the
territory of pericallosal artery was found to provoke
spontaneous grasping of objects that previously had been
touched by the hand (tactile stimulus to the palmar sur-
face). The patient, aware of this behavior, could stop it
only by starting another movement. The authors sug-
gested this grasp reflex be a cutaneous spinal reflex un-
like »other grasping behaviors«26. A lesion of thalamo-
-cortical pathways (paramedian thalamic region) can
result in utilization behavior27, as well as a combined le-
sion of left anterior cingulum and the head of the right
caudate nucleus (which brought some authors to the idea
that cingulum and caudatus should be considered as a
functional complex)28. Patients with left ventral inferior
frontal damage often try to verbally inhibit the action
(saying »No!«), but then still perform it29. In another
case of utilization behavior, the patient was caught to
pick up cards and deal. Goldberg et al.30 describe utiliza-
tion behavior (although not calling it so) as a symptom of
the »alien-hand sign« (beside forced grasp and motor
perseveration; all limited to the contralateral hand).
Shallice and collaborators31 noticed that utilization does
not occur only when objects are presented directly to the
patient (induced behavior), but even when they are be-
side the patient and he is ordered another task (inciden-
tal behavior). The findings were interpreted as the lack
of Supervisory Attention System and the random trig-
gering of action scheme. At any rate, it is justified to view
utilization behavior as a pathological (uninhibited) ver-
sion of visuo-motor priming32. Following the logic of
some of the described cases where aneurysm of the ante-
rior communication artery was found (with destroyed
head of the caudate nucleus), Lhermitte hypothesized
that orbital frontal cortex might be responsible for the
supervision of action start (releasing or not parietal lobe
activities22,23. The idea that (contralateral) orbitofrontal
cortex and/or anterior cingulum might really be in char-
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ge of motor inhibition was supported by the finding33 of
their activation in hysterical paralysis (at the same time,
there was no activation noted in the DLPFC and pre-
motor cortex). Carmichael and Price34 were more precise,
assigning to area 13 a motivational signal which, in nor-
mal circumstances, decides whether a plan from the
premotor cortex will be started or not (which is in accor-
dance with the finding that sensory-to-motor transfor-
mation, i.e., the realization of a plan in the premotor cor-
tex takes place only if the action is connected with
reward)35. If area 13 is damaged, logically, an automatic
sensory-to-motor transformation occurs (that is, utiliza-
tion behavior). The parallel of hypnosis with utilization
behavior has already been noted and discussed at some
length in a recent study by Woody and Szechtman36.
Combining data from a long list of experiments and
clinical experience, Deecke et al.37 suggested a general
strategy of action: 1) WHAT to do (decision to be brought
in the orbitofrontal region receiving input from hypo-
thalamus and limbic system; this part should balance
motivation, moral judgement, and the inhibitory control
of primitive drives); 2) HOW to do (frontolateral cortex
receiving afferents from the posterior sensory cortices);
3) WHEN to do (frontomesial cortex, especially SMA
with its Bereitschaftspotential – »action timing«, a lesion
in this region leaves the possibility of re-acting, but not
to act spontaneously).
More complex clinical hypotheses of the frontal lobe
function are still waiting to be proved or disconfirmed:
attention deficit disorder (ex »hyperkinetic reaction of
childhood«) has been linked to the disturbance of fron-
tal-lobe inhibitory functions38; schizophrenia has been
linked to deficits of prefrontal dorsolateral surface; ob-
sessive-compulsive disorder was noted to follow a higher
activity in orbitofrontal cortex39,40. Posner and Peter-
sen41 have investigated the role of frontal cortex in resis-
tance to distraction and sustained attention. It is not by
chance that neuroscience is searching in the frontal lobes
for the underpinnings of the most sophisticated human
abilities, since here, the roots of action as well as the
roots of thought seem to intermingle.
Frontal Lobes and Hypnosis: A History
of Linking
In the mid of the 1970-ies, Pribram and McGuiness42
proposed a model of attention explaining that the pre-
frontal cortex controls the limbic system in the gating of
sensory stimuli arriving from the periphery. The model
was corroborated by more recent ERP studies demon-
strating the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in the
inhibition of the conscious perception of pain43 and by
neuroimaging studies differentiating certain and uncer-
tain expectation of pain, activating the rostral anterior
cingulate cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex44.
Moreover, Helen Crawford’s studies revealed an increas-
ed cerebral blood flow in the orbito-frontal cortex during
hypnotic analgesia45, which was explained as an increase
in attentional efforts46: more precisely and more proba-
bly, what has been activated is an inhibitory loop local-
ized in this region.
The finding that highly-hypnotizable persons have
more efficient frontal attentional and inhibitory systems,
has been stressed in a series of papers47,48. Parallelly,
Spiegel & King49 found a positive correlation between do-
pamine activity (as a measure of frontal involvement)
and hypnotizability. More difficult, however, has been to
localize the activity within the frontal lobes. While Ha-
lama50, using SPECT, reported an increase in CBF dur-
ing hypnosis (termed »frontalization«) particularly in
the right hemisphere, John Gruzelier’s group revealed a
shift during hypnotic induction, transferring cerebral ac-
tivity peaks from the left frontal cortex towards right
posterior regions of the brain48. This shift, with an ex-
pressed inhibition of frontal function occurring as soon
as focal attention systems are activated51, might be a re-
flex of the task performance in which the subject is en-
gaged after the induction (primarily imagery). The initial
increase in frontal perfusion, however, does occur also in
»empty« hypnosis experiments, i.e., hypnotic induction
without subsequent tasks (»basic hypnotic state« with
deep relaxation and no specific suggestion52), as stressed
by Walter53. Gruzelier and Warren48 ascribe the most
prominent hypnotic features, like suspension of reality
testing, abdication of planning functions, and reduced
attentional monitoring of external cues, to the inhibition
of frontal functions following the left to-right and ante-
rior-to-posterior shift of activity. The results of the more
recent PET and EEG study by Rainville and collabo-
rators54, however, do not agree with those of Gruzelier.
Rainville founds an increase in rCBF in the inferior fron-
tal gyri during hypnotic relaxation, but even additional
widespread increases in rCBF in the predominantly left
frontal cortices during hypnosis with suggestions for al-
tered pain unpleasantness. More recently, there have
been experimental attempts at relating hypnosis to fron-
tal-executive dysfunctions. Since the main result was
that, in a baseline condition, high susceptible individuals
had performed significantly better on the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test55, those attempts will still have to wait
for a final confirmation56.
Anterior Cingulate
A frontal structure that, beside the orbitofrontal cor-
tex, proved to be involved in some of the hypnotic phe-
nomena is the anterior cingulate. The role of this structure
in hypnotic analgesia was evidenced by Helen Crawford’s
group57. This finding coincides with the data obtained by
Marshall et al.33, who revealed significant PET activity
both in orbitofrontal region and in the anterior cingulate
during a movement trial in a patient with hysterical limb
paralysis. In this case, the anterior cingulate was found
to suppress inappropriate motor responses, triggered, in-
terestingly, by volitional effort only.
The area 32 of the right anterior cingulate was found
to be active in a group of hallucinators when they heard
an auditory stimulus and when they hallucinated hear-
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ing it but not when they merely imagined hearing it58.
The study, performed with PET, did not detect the same
activation in the group of highly hypnotizable nonhal-
lucinators. The authors emphasized the similarity of the
described activations with those previously seen in schi-
zophrenic hallucinations.
The involvement of the anterior cingulate in hypnosis
might be responsible also for a higher error rate at the
Stroop task (reflecting a failure in the inhibition of auto-
matic responses), found in highly hypnotizable subjects59.
Gruzelier suggests that, what occurs during hypnosis, is
a dissociation between cognitive-executive and affecti-
ve-executive functions of the anterior cingulate, the for-
mer being related to response selection while the latter
being engaged in the regulation of autonomic and endo-
crine functions (for new data relating human cingulate
cortex to autonomic control, see Critchley et al.60). Ac-
cording to Gruzelier61, cognitive-executive component
remains intact during hypnosis, while the affect system
cease to function. Knowing that hypnosis is related to the
inhibition of amygdala62, which is strongly interconnect-
ed with the anterior cingulate, the fact that this compo-
nent remains unresponsive, does not surprise any more
and fits quite well to the image of hypnosis as an emo-
tionally underbalanced state, characterized by a signifi-
cant and measurable decrease in the emotional impact of
pain perception63 or of prosodic imitation64, for instance.
The involvement of anterior cingulate, in addition, could
explain the gating of sensory input arriving via thalamus
and the consequent motor response selection. The activ-
ity of anterior cingulate during imagery tasks, as re-
vealed by the study of Stephan et al.65, again fits well to
hypnosis, especially to its more advanced phases.
The Lateralization Problems, Solutions,
and New Problems
The lateralization issue has been a particularly vividly
discussed problem during the last several decades al-
ready. The earlier widely accepted idea of the predomi-
nance of the right hemisphere activity in hypnotic pro-
cessing66 recently was challenged by a series of studies
finding no lateralization at all. Crawford and collabo-
rators45 supported such a view by a xenon-rCBF experi-
ment, and the first PET study of hypnosis67 agreed with
them. Therefore, although no final decision can be made,
at the present state of knowledge, it seems far more rea-
sonable to avoid speaking of hypnosis as a »right-hemi-
sphere task.«
Recent advances at the lateralization issue, neverthe-
less, open new problems on the other side. If conscious
processing (whatever this might be) is connected with
the left (dominant) prefrontal cortex, as suggested by
certain studies68, and if the same left prefrontal cortex is
able to modulate the ipsilateral amygdala being in charge
of »positive« emotions, and if the involvement of the left
hemisphere results in the up-regulation of the immune
system69, than what is occurring with all those parame-
ters during post-induction hypnosis, when the left pre-
frontal cortex becomes inactivated? Does it mean that
only the phase of hypnotic induction can procure benefits
for the health of the subject, while the continuation of
the session down-regulates the immune-system activity
level and stirs up negative emotions? Common experi-
ence does not agree with this theoretical logic. On the
contrary, hypnosis and self-hypnosis have been used to
increase creativity, enthusiasm, and health in general.
Oppositely to theoretical predictions that hypnosis shifts
the cerebral activity from left to right, it has been dem-
onstrated that, during hypnosis, an increase in vagotonus
occurs63, and it is known that parasympathetic hyperac-
tivation is connected with the stimulation of left hu-
man-brain structures (insula)70 and corresponds to the
effects of some other non-hypnotic relaxation techniques
like yoga or meditation71. Maybe the key for these para-
doxes is the inactivation of amygdala, which is supposed
to occur during hypnosis62: this fact could at least explain
the different emotion logic. At any rate, one will have to
know much more not only about hypnosis, but about
emotions, consciousness, and the autonomic system in
order to be able to disentangle this knot.
Hypnotic Memory and Confabulation
Easier than anywhere else, the pathways of hypnosis
and the frontal lobes can be crossed over the field of
memory. The acquisition of data has been brought in con-
nection with the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and
retrosplenial area, while retrieval has been found to acti-
vate particularly the right prefrontal cortex and the
precuneus72. Encoding is thought to involve executive
system and the left-frontal control of hippocampus73,
while retrieval seems to use slightly different loops within
the right prefrontal cortex, depending on whether it was
internally or externally specified. When internally con-
trolled, retrieval process predominantly activates the
dorsolateral region; when externally cued (by the experi-
menter, like in hypnosis), ventrolateral activity aug-
ments74. A broad array of memory deficits has been re-
lated to frontal lesions: impairment of free recall,
metamemory (knowledge about retrieval strategies), so-
urce memory (factual information without the knowl-
edge of the context in which the information was encoun-
tered), etc.15. One possible basis for these defects is an
inefficient inhibition (»filtering« or »gating«) of irrele-
vant information or irrelevant posterior areas. If we ac-
cept Gruzelier’s suggestion that, what follows the initial
frontal activation, is frontal inhibition, then this »inhibi-
tion of frontal inhibitory structures« could be compared
to the effects of frontal lesions. According to McConkey47,
three major phenomena regarding memory might be en-
countered after hypnotic induction: hypermnesia, mem-
ory distortion, and pseudomemory (»false memories«)75.
Hereby, hypermnesia denotes the uncritical delivering of
the material encoded in the long-term memory; memory
distortions imply mixing of encoded material and the ele-
ments of imagination; while pseudomemory consists of
the hypnotizer’s suggestions which are accepted as the
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subject’s own memories. Actually, all of those three hyp-
notic-memory phenomena might be reduced to defective
inhibition. Hypermnesia can be viewed as an »unblock-
ing« of memory, a release of stored material without or
with significantly lowered moral, social, and biological
inhibitions. Memory distortions and pseudomemories,
on the other hand, might be explained as a consequence
of a deficient filtering of true data versus imagination
constructs or external information, respectively, with the
inefficient inhibition of the latter ones. It would be diffi-
cult to precise whether the inhibition of always the same
inhibitory loop is responsible for the appearance of all
three hypnotic memory phenomena: more probably, one
loop evades moral/social barriers (hypermnesia), a sec-
ond one filters reality from imagination (memory distor-
tion), while a third one inhibits pseudo-perception (pse-
udomemory). This would also be in accordance with the
scheme proposed by Goldman-Rakic1, claiming that dif-
ferent prefrontal cortical areas render the same service
(inhibition, filtering) to different posterior regions. Let
us stress at this point that there is growing evidence76–79
against the old position that hypnosis can yield meaning-
ful increase in memory. That the so called »temporal re-
gression« (i.e., conforming to childhood norms) during
hypnosis might actually be only topographic regression
(i.e., eliciting of more imagistic and affect-laden mate-
rial), has been proposed by the studies of Michael
Nash80,81. Moreover, precisely because of the unfortunate
and inextricable blend of really stored data and imagina-
tive or heterosuggestive elements, it becomes clear how
dangerous and futile are all too strict confidings in depo-
sitions under hypnosis.
What is more interesting for our comparisons is a dis-
turbance known as confabulation, encounterable in cer-
tain frontal pathologies. Confabulation means »false
statements that are not made to deceive, are typically
more coherent than thoughts produced during delirium,
and do not reflect underlying psychopathology«82. Amne-
sia is not sufficient condition for confabulation83 and, on
the other hand, not all »frontal syndrome« patients
confabulate83. Specific deficits described in confabulating
patients consider the recall of autobiographical memo-
ries that rivals the detailed report of imagined events,
and source monitoring (for instance, the identification of
speaker84). Obviously, there is a striking similarity be-
tween hypnotic memory phenomena and confabulation:
hypermnesia as criticism lowering, memory distortion as
blending facts with imagination, and pseudomemory as a
mess in source attribution, all these elements are to be
traced both during hypnosis and in confabulating pa-
tients. One would dare to suggest that hypnosis is com-
parable to a reversible inactivation of the area supplied
by the anterior communicating artery, the pathology of
which usually results in confabulation. Woody and Bow-
ers85 have, already discussed the idea that hypnotic ef-
fects on memory may be likened to the effects of frontal
lesions, in a work.
Conclusions
If one takes the prefrontal cortex as a complex system
of control/inhibitory loops and accepts that suggestion
implies the inhibition of one’s own internal »motors,«
then it is more than logical to expect that the prefrontal
cortex will play the crucial role in hypnotic induction and
an obligatory supportive role in all post-induction tasks
processing. Hypnotic dissociation has already been sug-
gested to result from partial suppression of frontal func-
tions85–87. This idea brings us to an alternative neuropsy-
chophysiological definition of hypnosis (or suggestion) as
the process of external manipulation with frontal-lobe
functions with consequent effects upon the entire brain
potential of the subject. The normal behavioral paradigm
implies parietal preparation for action and a subsequent
premotor selection of appropriate motor pattern, which
is constantly monitored by the prefrontal cortical inhibi-
tory system. In hypnosis, the prefrontal inhibitory sys-
tem is inhibited, and the parietal incentive to action is
partly replaced by external suggestions that can be
transformed into actions without the prefrontal inhibi-
tory monitoring. This new loop is characterized by a sig-
nificant degree of automaticity88. It has been suggested
that the crucial phenomena characterizing hypnosis are
the lost of insight into the causes of one’s own action
(similarly to what occurs in schizophrenic patients with a
defective »internal monitor«89) and/or the weakening of
volition90. The frontal lobes might be the ideal site to
support both phenomena, since both the monitoring of
action and volitional control have been related to frontal
structures39,22).
Although our definition agrees with the suggestion by
Kirsch & Lynn91 advocating the abandoning of »hypnotic
state hypothesis« and favoring theories based on the con-
cept of hierarchical control systems, we are fully aware of
its »provisionality and the necessary incompleteness«90.
Therefore, it would be erroneous to think that this paper
tries to »solve« the problem of neurophysiological basis
of hypnosis by attributing the location of processes to the
frontal lobes: this paper only speculates upon the grow-
ing evidence indicating the central role of the prefrontal
cortex in triggering the most or even all hypnotic phe-
nomena.
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HIPNOZA I MODERNI KONCEPTI ^EONOG RE@NJA – SKICA ZA PREGLED I POZIV
K TEMI KOJA OSOBITO OBE]AVA
S A @ E T A K
^lanak nastoji sa`eto prikazati najzna~ajnije koncepte moderne neuropsihologije ~eonih re`njeva i povezati ta ot-
kri}a s fenomenologijom koju obi~no susre}emo u istra`ivanju i prakticiranju hipnoze. ^eoni re`anj istra`uje se pro-
teklih godina vrlo intenzivno, a rezultati tih istra`ivanja, uklju~uju}i sindrome opisane pri o{te}enjima ~eonih re`njeva
i u psihijatrijskih bolesnika, otkrivaju zapanjuju}u podudarnost s pojavama u hipnozi. Temelje}i se na tim sli~nostima,
u ~lanku se predla`e alternativna neuropsihofiziologijska definicija hipnoze odnosno sugestije, koja na ove pojave gleda
kao na proces vanjske manipulacije funkcijama ~eonog re`nja, s posljedi~nim u~incima na cjelokupni mo`dani odnosno
mentalni potencijal.
A. Muzur: Hypnosis and the Frontal Lobes, Coll. Antropol. 30 (2006) 1: 205–211
211
